Formal Specification and Enactment of Security Policies through Agent Coordination Contexts

Andrea Omicini

Our research moves from three fundamental considerations that concern the modelling and engineering of complex systems. First, organization, coordination and security are strictly related issues that should be modelled in a uniform and coherent framework. Second, models, technologies and methodologies should come hand in hand, so that abstractions used in the analysis and design stages should be still “alive and kicking'” at development and execution time. Third, the general non-formalisability of complex systems should not prevent us from using formal tools whenever useful, such as in proving or ensuring properties of limited but meaningful portions of a system. By focussing on multi-agent systems, we discuss the notion of Agent Coordination Context (ACC) as an abstraction that (i) works as an organization and security abstraction, (ii) integrates well with abstractions provided by coordination infrastructures, and (iii) covers the engineering process from design to deployment. In particular, in this talk we study the syntax and semantics of a language for ACCs specification, exploiting typical process algebra techniques. Accordingly, we show that process algebras are a suitable tool for both specification and enactment of security and coordination policies through ACCs.


  • 1st European Workshop on Multi-Agent Systems (EUMAS 2003) — 18/12/2003–19/12/2003



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1st European Workshop on Multiagent Systems (EUMAS 2003), Oxford, UK

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Oxford, UK

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