Ascribing Mental Qualities to Machines

John McCarthy

Philosophical Perspectives in Artificial Intelligence, pages 161-195
Harvester Studies in Cognitive Science,  1979
Harvester Press, Brighton
Martin Ringle (eds.)

Ascribing mental qualities like beliefs, intentions and wants to a machine is sometimes correct if done conservatively and is sometimes necessary to express what is known about its state. We propose some new definitional tools for this: definitions relative to an approximate theory and second order structural definitions.

 @incollection{ascribingmental-mccarthy1979,
Address = {Brighton},
Author = {McCarthy, John},
Booktitle = {Philosophical Perspectives in Artificial Intelligence},
Editor = {Ringle, Martin},
Isbn = {085527901X},
Pages = {161--195},
Publisher = {Harvester Press},
Series = {Harvester Studies in Cognitive Science},
Title = {Ascribing Mental Qualities to Machines},
Url = {http://www-formal.stanford.edu/jmc/ascribing/ascribing.html},
Year = 1979} 

Publication

— authors

John McCarthy

— editors

Martin Ringle

— status

published

— sort

book chapter

Venue

— volume

Philosophical Perspectives in Artificial Intelligence

— series

Harvester Studies in Cognitive Science

— pages

161-195

— publication date

1979

URLs

original page

Identifiers

— print ISBN

085527901X

BibTeX

— BibTeX ID
ascribingmental-mccarthy1979
— BibTeX category
incollection

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