McCarthyAscribingmental1979

John McCarthy

Ascribing mental qualities like beliefs, intentions and wants to a machine is sometimes correct if done conservatively and is sometimes necessary to express what is known about its state. We propose some new definitional tools for this: definitions relative to an approximate theory and second order structural definitions.

Philosophical Perspectives in Artificial Intelligence, Harvester Studies in Cognitive Science, pages 161-195, 1979.
Martin Ringle (eds.), Harvester Press, Brighton

@incollection{ascribingmental-mccarthy1979,
	Address = {Brighton},
	Author = {McCarthy, John},
	Booktitle = {Philosophical Perspectives in Artificial Intelligence},
	Editor = {Ringle, Martin},
	Isbn = {085527901X},
	Pages = {161--195},
	Publisher = {Harvester Press},
	Series = {Harvester Studies in Cognitive Science},
	Title = {Ascribing Mental Qualities to Machines},
	Url = {http://www-formal.stanford.edu/jmc/ascribing/ascribing.html},
	Year = 1979}