Enrico Denti, Nando Prati

In this paper we study coalitions of indirect stockholders of a company showing that they can have different controlling power, and therefore different relevance in the control problem. We then introduce a suitable classification, and three algorithms to find all the coalitions of all relevances.

Theory and Decision 56(2), pages 183-192, 2 2004, Kluwer Academic Publishers
Double Special Issue
@article {DP-2003,
   author       = {Denti,Enrico AND Prati,Nando},
   title        = {Relevance of Winning Coalitions in Indirect Control of Corporations},
   year         = {2004},
   booktitle    = {Essays on Cooperative Games - in honor of Guillermo Owen},
   journal      = {Theory and Decision},
   publisher    = {Kluwer Academic Publishers},
   volume       = {56},
   number       = {2},
   month        = {2},
   pages        = {183--192},
   issn         = {0040-5833},
   note         = {Double Special Issue},
   doi         = {10.1007/s11238-004-5644-4}
}

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Publication

Relevance of Winning Coalitions in Indirect Control of Corporations

— status

published  

— authors

Enrico Denti, Nando Prati

URLs & IDs

— DOI

10.1007/s11238-004-5644-4

— Scopus

2-s2.0-9144263047&

— print ISSN

0040-5833

BibTeX

— BibTeX ID
DP-2003
— BibTeX category
article

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