Enrico Denti, Nando Prati
In this paper we study coalitions of indirect stockholders of a company showing that they can have different controlling power, and therefore different relevance in the control problem. We then introduce a suitable classification, and three algorithms to find all the coalitions of all relevances.
Theory and Decision 56(2), pages 183-192, 2 2004, Kluwer Academic Publishers
Double Special Issue
@article {DP-2003,
author = {Denti,Enrico AND Prati,Nando},
title = {Relevance of Winning Coalitions in Indirect Control of Corporations},
year = {2004},
booktitle = {Essays on Cooperative Games - in honor of Guillermo Owen},
journal = {Theory and Decision},
publisher = {Kluwer Academic Publishers},
volume = {56},
number = {2},
month = {2},
pages = {183--192},
issn = {0040-5833},
note = {Double Special Issue},
doi = {10.1007/s11238-004-5644-4}
}