The Sybil Attack
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abstract = {Large-scale peer-to-peer systems face security threats from faulty or hostile remote computing elements. To resist these threats, many such systems employ redundancy. However, if a single faulty entity can present multiple identities, it can control a substantial fraction of the system, thereby undermining this redundancy. One approach to preventing these ``Sybil attacks'' is to have a trusted agency certify identities. This paper shows that, without a logically centralized authority, Sybil attacks are always possible except under extreme and unrealistic assumptions of resource parity and coordination among entities.},
apice = {SybilIptps2002},
author = {John R. Douceur},
booktitle = {1st International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems (IPTPS 2002)},
doi = {10.1007/3-540-45748-8_24},
editor = {Peter Druschel and Frans Kaashoek and Antony Rowstron},
eisbn = {978-3-540-45748-0},
eissn = {1611-3349},
isbn = {978-3-540-44179-3},
issn = {0302-9743},
month = oct,
note = {Revised Papers},
numpages = 10,
openalex = {W1520914943},
pages = {251--260},
publisher = {Springer},
series = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science},
title = {The Sybil Attack},
url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/3-540-45748-8_24},
urlpdf = {https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/3-540-45748-8_24.pdf},
volume = 2429,
year = 2002
}
