On Security Analysis of Proof-of-Elapsed-Time (PoET)
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abstract = {As more applications are built on top of blockchain and public ledger, different approaches are developed to improve the performance of blockchain construction. Recently Intel proposed a new concept of proof-of-elapsed-time (PoET), which leverages trusted computing to enforce random waiting times for block construction. However, trusted computing component may not be perfect and 100% reliable. It is not clear, to what extent, blockchain systems based on PoET can tolerate failures of trusted computing component. The current design of PoET lacks rigorous security analysis and a theoretical foundation for assessing its strength against such attacks. To fulfill this gap, we develop a theoretical framework for evaluating a PoET based blockchain system, and show that the current design is vulnerable in the sense that adversary can jeopardize the blockchain system by only compromising Θ(log log n/log n) fraction of the participating nodes, which is very small when n is relatively large. Based on our theoretical analysis, we also propose methods to mitigate these vulnerabilities.},
address = {Cham},
apice = {PoetSss2017},
author = {Lin Chen and Lei Xu and Nolan Shah and Zhimin Gao and Yang Lu and Weidong Shi},
booktitle = {Stabilization, Safety, and Security of Distributed Systems (SSS 2017)},
doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-69084-1_19},
editor = {Paul Spirakis and Philippas Tsigas},
eissn = {1611-3349},
isbn = {978-3-319-69084-1},
issn = {0302-9743},
numpages = 16,
openalex = {W2762888877},
pages = {282--297},
publisher = {Springer},
series = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science},
title = {On Security Analysis of Proof-of-Elapsed-Time (PoET)},
url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-319-69084-1_19},
urlpdf = {https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/978-3-319-69084-1_19.pdf},
volume = 10616,
year = 2017
}