



RBAC for MAS Coordination Infrastructure

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Outline

- Context & goals: modelling **security** issues on top of an agent **coordination infrastructure**
- Role-Based Access Control (**RBAC**) Model Overview
- RBAC in MAS infrastructure through Agent Coordination Contexts (**ACC**)
- Embedding RBAC in **TuCSon** infrastructure

Context

- Software engineering perspective
 - agents and MAS as engineering paradigm
 - MAS *organisation* and *coordination* as basic engineering dimensions
- Security issues in the context of MAS organisation and coordination models
 - focus on access control
 - (organisation | coordination | security) relationships
 - shaping (specifying, constraining) the agent interaction space
 - security as *normative* counterpart of coordination
 - static (organisation) + dynamic (coordination) management
- *Infrastructure* level
 - devising structures & services useful for engineering systems on top


Goals

- Modelling access control within a coordination / organisation context
- Integrating a Role-Based Access Control model (RBAC) model on an existing agent based coordination Infrastructure (TuCSoN)

RBAC Model Overview

- State-of-the-art models for engineering security in complex information systems
- Access-control policies formulated in terms of *roles*
- Specifying and enforcing forms of separation of duty (static and dynamic)
 - User-role, inter-role and role-resource relationships
- Flexible administration of security policy
 - security policy encapsulation
 - dynamic / open environment

RBAC Architecture




“Proposed NIST Standard for RBAC” (Ferraiolo, Sandhu, Gavrila, Kuhn, Chandramouli)
ACM Transactions on Information System and Security, 4(3), 2001

*How to embed
an RBAC-like architecture in
the agent world
(in MAS models / infrastructures) ?*

Agent Coordination Contexts (ACC)


- Infrastructure abstraction modelling / engineering agent *presence* inside an environment



ACC characterisation


- [ACC as an *stateful runtime interface* (contract)]
 - Defining the space of agent (allowed) *actions* inside an environment
 - Enforcing patterns of actions / protocols
- [ACC as an *organisational abstraction*]
 - Representing the set of dynamic roles the agent is playing inside an organisational environment
 - Each agent has an ACC for each organisation where playing
 - roles can be activated / deactivated at runtime in the ACC
- [An ACC as a *working session*]
 - An agent obtains an ACC to start playing inside an organisation, and then release it when finishing


RBAC with ACCs



Applying the approach: TuCSoN Coordination Infrastructure


- TuCSoN = Tuple Centre Spread over the Network
- *Tuple centres* as general purpose customisable coordination artifacts shared and accessed by agents
 - programmable tuple space (~reactive logic based blackboards)
 - out, in, rd operations for inserting / retrieving logic tuples to / from tuple centres
 - coordinating behaviour specified with a ReSpecT program
 - get_spec, set_spec to change the coordinating behaviour dynamically
- Tuple centres are collected (distributed) in TuCSoN *nodes*






ACC in TuCSoN

- **ACC** = runtime interface used by an agent for interacting with tuple centres
 - defines agent (allowed) operation on tuple centres
 - in, rd, out, inp, rdp
 - get_spec, set_spec



RBAC in TuCSoN



Role policy description

- Extending RBAC policy for handling protocols and context-awareness

Representation of current role state

Notion of local time, agent position, identity..

Policy expressed as a Prolog theory

```
can_do(CurrentState, Action, NextState)  
      :- Conditions.
```

Policy Examples

Resource Access

Student Role:

```
can_do(_,printer ? out(doc_to_print(type(txt),Document)),_).
```

Professor Role:

```
can_do(_,printer ? out(doc_to_print(type(_),Document)),_).
```

```
can_do(_,printer ? rd(config(_)),_).
```

Technician Role:

```
can_do(_,printer ? out(config(_)),_).
```

```
can_do(_,printer ? rd(config(_)),_).
```

Msg Box Service

User Role:

```
can_do(_,msg_box?out(msg(AgentID,Content)),_).
```

```
can_do(_,msg_box?in(msg(AgentId,Content)),_):-agent_id(AgentId).
```

Context awareness

Guest Role:

```
can_do(_,Action, _):- session_time(ST), ST < T.
```

```
can_do(_, Tid ? out(_), _):-local_node(Node).
```

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Context awareness

Guest Role:

```
can_do(_,Action, _):- session_time(ST), ST < T.
```

```
can_do(_, Tid ? out(_), _):-local_node(Node).
```

A more involved example: A Constrained Contract Net Protocol

The Contract Net Protocol

Task allocation from *masters* to *workers*

Masters make a task announcement, workers provide their bids, and then the task is allocated to the winning bidder, chosen by the master

open systems perspective

Desiderata

explicitly specifying/enforcing master & worker protocols

avoiding malicious/wrong interactions


openness challenge

CNP with ACCs and a Coordination Artifact


TuCSon approach

A coordination artifact for supporting the task allocation
coordination activity (tasks tuple centre)

ACC for specifying & ruling agent actions, playing master
and worker roles




CNP Protocols & Coordination Laws




A Master

```
enterACC(acme.org,
         [organisation(acme), role(master,task_distribution)])
tasks ? out(announcement(Task))
wait(ExpireTime)
tasks ? in(bids(Task,BidList))
Bid ← selectWinner(BidList)
tasks ? out(award(Task,Bid))
tasks ? in(result(Task,Result))
```



A Worker

```
enterACC(acme.org,
         [organisation(acme), role(worker,task_distribution)])
tasks ? rd(announcement(Task))
MyBid ← evaluate(Task)
tasks ? in(bid(Task,MyBid,Answer))
if (Answer=='awarded') {
    Result ← perform(Task)
    tasks ? out(result(Task,Result))
}
```



```
reaction( in(bid(Task,MyBid,Answer)), ( pre,
    out_r(contractor(Task, MyBid)),
    in_r(bids(Task, L)),
    out_r(bids(Task, [MyBid|L])) ).

reaction( out(announcement(Task)), (
    out_r(bids(Task, [])) ).

reaction( in(bids(Task,L)), ( post,
    in_r(announcement(Task)) ).

reaction( out(award(Task,TheBid)), (
    in_r(award(Task,TheBid)),
    in_r(contractor(Task,TheBid)),
    out_r(bid(Task,TheBid,awarded)),
    out_r(refuse_others(Task)) ).
```

```
reaction( out(award(Task,TheBid)), (
    in_r(award(Task,TheBid)),
    in_r(contractor(Task,TheBid)),
    out_r(bid(Task,TheBid,awarded)),
    out_r(refuse_others(Task)) ).

reaction( out_r(refuse_others(Task)), (
    in_r(refuse_others(Task)),
    in_r(contractor(Task,TheBid)),
    out_r(bid(Task,TheBid,'not-awarded')),
    new_task_announcement(Task)) ).

reaction( out_r(refuse_others(Task)), (
    in_r(refuse_others(Task)),
    no_r(contractor(_, _)) ).
```

ACC for Masters

```
enterACC(acme.org,  
        [organisation(acme), role(master,task_distribution)])  
tasks ? out(announcement(Task))  
wait(ExpireTime)  
tasks ? in(bids(Task,BidList))  
Bid ← selectWinner(BidList)  
tasks ? out(award(Task,Bid))  
tasks ? in(result(Task,Result))
```


```
organisation(acme).  
role(master,task_distribution).  
can_do(init, tasks ? out(announcement(Task)), task_announced(Task)).  
can_do(task_announced(Task), tasks ? rd(announcement(Task)),_).  
can_do(task_announced(Task), tasks ? rd(bids(Task), ),_).  
can_do(task_announced(Task), tasks ? in(bids(Task),BidList)),award_bidder(Task,BidList)).  
can_do(award_bidder(Task,BidList), tasks ? out(award(Task,Bid)), get_result(Task,Bid)):-  
    element(Bid,BidList).  
can_do(get_result(Task,_), tasks ? rd(result(Task,_)),_).  
can_do(get_result(Task,_), tasks ? in(result(Task,_)),init).
```



ACC for Workers

```
enterACC(acme.org,  
    [organisation(acme), role(worker,task_distribution)])  
tasks ? rd(announcement(Task))  
MyBid ← evaluate(Task)  
tasks ? in(bid(Task,MyBid,Answer))  
if (Answer=='awarded') {  
    Result ← perform(Task)  
    tasks ? out(result(Task,Result))  
}
```

```
organisation(acme).  
role(worker,task_distribution).  
can_do(init, tasks ? rd(announcement(_)),_).  
can_do(init, tasks ? in(bid(Task,_,awarded)),awarded(Task)).  
can_do(awarded(Task), tasks ? out(result(Task,_),init)).
```



Outcome

Integration of security specification and enactment
(access control in particular) within an organisation
and coordination model
conceptual integrity

Exploiting RBAC security properties in a MAS context
separation of duty
encapsulation of policy
flexible and scalable management / administration
supporting dynamic contexts
supporting heterogeneity & openness

Ongoing work

Re-engineering some real world applications on top of TuCSoN already designed and developed without RBAC support

Distributed Workflow Management Systems

Improving the prototype implementation (TuCSoN 2.0.0)

Defining a formal semantics (based on process algebra) for the RBAC architecture

Integration with ACC formal model