



Objective versus Subjective Coordination in the Engineering of Agent Systems

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Objective vs. Subjective Coordination ...

Outline:

1. Introduction
2. Coordination: Overview
3. Subjective vs. Objective Coordination
4. Coordination and AOSE
5. Vision



Why Coordination?

- *Interaction* as an Independent Dimension in Today's (Computer-based) Systems
 - non-trivial systems are multi-part & dynamic
 - coordination as managing interaction
- *Sociality* as a Fundamental Issue in Multi-Agent Systems
 - social abstraction is perhaps more powerful than MAS
 - organisational viewpoint on systems
 - social laws as coordination laws



Why Agents and SE?

- Out of the Academia
 - models, technologies, and methodologies for the engineering of multiagent systems
 - SE for MAS
- Agents as the Next Big Thing in SE
 - agent-oriented abstractions to tackle complexity of today's system engineering
 - MAS for SE



Why Coordination and AOSE?

- Engineering the Interaction Space
 - interaction as an independent dimension for the engineering of non-trivial systems
 - need for specific abstractions, model, technologies, and methodologies
- Engineering Agent Societies
 - societies as first-class entities
 - models, technologies, and methodologies for the engineering of agent societies



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What is Coordination?


- Everybody knows, nobody agrees
 - “This is not *coordination*”
- Robotics, Software Engineering, Multi-Agent Systems, Programming Languages, ...
- Social Sciences, Economy, Biology, ...




Coordination: Definition 1

Coordination: management of dependencies (Malone & Crowston)

Agent 1



Agent 2



type A

type B




Coordination: Definition 1

- Ontology:
 - “coordinables”:
 - agents / processes
 - objects of coordination:
 - tasks/ goals/ activities/...
 - taxonomy of dependencies:
 - shared resources, producer/consumer etc.
 - set of coordination actions / primitives / transactions:
 - synchronisation, resource selection etc.
 - out, in, rd
- Coordination process:
 - dependency **detection**: which dependencies are present
 - management **decision**: which coordination actions/primitives to apply
 - these tasks usually guide complex agent interactions....



Coordination: Definition 2

Coordination: constraining interaction (Wegner)



Coordination: More Definitions

- “Coordination is the process of building programs by gluing together active pieces”
“A coordination model is the glue that binds together activities into an ensemble” (Carriero & Gelernter)
- “A coordination model provides a framework in which the interaction of active and independent entities ... can be expressed” (Ciancarini)
- “The integration and harmonious adjustment of individual work efforts towards the accomplishment of a larger goal” (B. Singh)
- “Co-ordination is a way of adapting to the environment”
(von Martial)



A layered Model of Coordination

Application layer: engineer for desired properties / functionalities

- *Coordination mechanisms*
- Coordination laws, norms, conventions, etc.

Framework layer: middleware

- Coordination languages: protocol languages (COOL etc.)
- Coordination media: tuple-based (TuCSoN etc.)

Infrastructure layer: enabling technologies

- Communication infrastructure
- Computing platforms



Coordination Mechanisms

Open vs. Closed:

- In closed environments, many assumptions are possible
 - coordination algorithms, efficiency issues
- In open environments, most assumptions are unlikely
 - open coordination services, security issues

Controlled vs. Uncontrolled:

- design-time controlled:
 - behaviour of all agents in the system is known at design time
- run-time controlled:
 - dynamically supervised coordination
- uncontrolled:
 - unexpected (frequencies of) behaviours are possible



Coordination Mechanisms

Direct vs. Mediated:

- mediated coordination mechanisms rely on a distinguished coordinator agent or coordination medium
- in direct mechanisms coordination “emerges” from peer-to-peer interaction

Coupled vs. Uncoupled (Tolksdorf, ESAW'00):


- Coupled coordination mechanisms are based on assumptions on some (other) agent's behaviour
- Uncoupled mechanisms impose no assumptions on agent behaviour

Quantitative vs. Qualitative:

- measure success of coordination in a qualitative fashion (utility etc.)
- quantitative stance on coordination dependencies



Coordination Mechanisms: Design Issues



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Objective vs. Subjective Coordination


Objective vs. subjective coordination (Schumacher, LNAI 2039)

- A coordination mechanism can be analysed from different perspectives:
 - Subjective perspective
 - *coordination from inside agents*
 - handling interaction from the individual agent's viewpoint
 - Objective perspective
 - *coordination from outside agents*
 - handling interaction from the infrastructure's viewpoint
- We argue that both perspectives need to be taken into account when designing a coordination mechanism




Objective vs. Subjective Coordination: An Example

- Domain:
 - urban road network
- Global goal:
 - assure **smooth flow of traffic**
- Actions:
 - traffic-sensitive proposals for **signal plans**



Objective vs. Subjective Coordination: An Example

- Intelligent traffic management agents:
 - each agent is responsible for one *problem area*
 - *knowledge-based* generation of alternative local signal plans
 - each agent ranks local signal plans w.r.t their *local* effects
 - co-ordination to cope with *interrelations* between local signal plans



Objective vs. Subjective Coordination: An Example

- Subjective perspective:
 - how to minimise negative impacts in the *local* problem area?
 - model self-interested behaviour
- Objective perspective:
 - how to minimise negative impacts equally among *all* problem areas?
 - objective biasing: design and tune social norms
- “*Structural cooperation*” (Ossowski, LNAI 1535):
 - coordination mechanism for closed environments that integrates both perspectives



Subjective perspective: Plan relations

- *Individual* context:
 - choose the individual plans $\pi_i, \dots, \pi_j$ that minimises *local* problems in an area
- *Social* context:
 - *multiplan* μ : simultaneous execution of individual plans $\pi_i, \dots, \pi_j$
 - Interrelation respecting executability of a plan(*exec*)
 - Interrelation respecting the outcome of a plan (*res*)
- Plan relations:

$$\text{indifferent}_s(\pi, \mu) \quad \begin{cases} \text{exec}(\pi, s) \mid \text{exec}(\pi \circ \mu, s) \mid \text{res}(\pi \circ \mu, s) = \text{res}(\pi, s) \\ \int (\downarrow \text{exec}(\pi, s) \mid \downarrow \text{exec}(\pi \circ \mu, s)) \end{cases}$$

$$\text{interferent}_s(\pi, \mu) \quad \begin{cases} \text{exec}(\pi, s) \mid \text{exec}(\pi \circ \mu, s) \mid \text{res}(\pi \circ \mu, s) \neq \text{res}(\pi, s) \end{cases}$$

$$\text{complementary}_s(\pi, \mu) \quad \begin{cases} \downarrow \text{exec}(\pi, s) \mid \text{exec}(\pi \circ \mu, s) \end{cases}$$

$$\text{inconsistent}_s(\pi, \mu) \quad \begin{cases} \text{exec}(\pi, s) \mid \downarrow \text{exec}(\pi \circ \mu, s) \end{cases}$$



Subjective perspective: Social dependencies

- *Dependence relations* among agents :

$$\begin{aligned}
 prevents_s(\alpha, \pi, \gamma, \mu) & \quad \models \quad prep_s(\alpha, \pi) \mid prep_s(\gamma, \mu) \mid inconsistent_s(\pi, \mu) \\
 enables_s(\alpha, \pi, \gamma, \mu) & \quad \models \quad prep_s(\alpha, \pi) \mid prep_s(\gamma, \mu) \mid complementary_s(\pi, \mu) \\
 hinders_s(\alpha, \pi, \gamma, \mu) & \quad \models \quad prep_s(\alpha, \pi) \mid prep_s(\gamma, \mu) \mid interferent_s(\pi, \mu) \mid \\
 & \quad \quad \quad res(\pi \circ \mu, s) \prec_{\alpha} res(\pi, s) \\
 favours_s(\alpha, \pi, \gamma, \mu) & \quad \models \quad prep_s(\alpha, \pi) \mid prep_s(\gamma, \mu) \mid interferent_s(\pi, \mu) \mid \\
 & \quad \quad \quad res(\pi, s) \prec_{\alpha} res(\pi \circ \mu, s)
 \end{aligned}$$


- Normative *context*:
 - preparedness (*prep*): capability + absence of prohibitions

$$prep_s(\gamma, \mu) \models can(\gamma, \mu) \mid \text{not forbidden}_s(\gamma, \mu)$$




Qualitative to quantitative mapping

- Modelling *cooperation*:
 - *Utility vector* of a multiplan: reduction of distance to ideal states of each agent
 - *Mixed multiplan*: probability distribution over a set of legally enactable multiplans
 - *Expected utility* of a mixed multiplan: weighed sum of utilities of the component plans
 - *Feasible region S*: all reachable utility vectors



Qualitative to quantitative mapping

- Modelling *conflict*:
 - conflict utility: best local choice given that all acquaintances jointly try to harm the agent
 - disagreement point $\vec{d}$
- Bargaining scenario $(S, \vec{d})$:
 - feasible region
 - +
 - disagreement point



Objective perspective: outcome of coordination

- Desirable *properties* of a *solution* $\vec{\varphi}$ to the bargaining scenario $(S, \vec{d})$:

- Individual rationality: $\vec{d} \leq \vec{\varphi}$

- Pareto-optimality: $\nexists \vec{x} \mid S, \vec{x} \succ \vec{\varphi}. \quad \vec{\varphi} \leq \vec{x}$

- Symmetry: *same bargaining position.* $\varphi_i = \varphi_j$

- Scale Invariance: φ_λ solution to $(\lambda S, \lambda \vec{d})$. $\lambda \vec{\varphi} = \vec{\varphi}_\lambda$

- Contraction Independence:
 $S' \mid S, \vec{d} \mid S', \vec{\varphi}' \text{ solution to } (S', \vec{d}). \quad \vec{\varphi} \mid S ? \quad \vec{\varphi}' = \vec{\varphi}$

- Theorem** (due to Nash):


The only vector $\vec{\varphi}$ that complies with the above axioms maximises the function

$$N(\vec{x}) = \prod_{i=1}^n (x_i - d_i)$$



Objective perspective: biasing the outcome

Disagreement Point Monotonicity:




Embodying Objective coordination

- *Ad hoc* implementations:
 - adapt agent architectures/ programmes
 - DCSP algorithms, . . .
- Coordination *middleware*:
 - specialised abstractions:
 - mediators, directory services, ontologies
 - general coordination abstractions:
 - tuple centres, manifolds, blobs
- Coordination as a *service*:
 - coordination abstractions as run-times
 - encapsulating coordination laws/ social laws/ social norms
 - open environments: agents free choose to use a service (and its laws...)



Objective Coordination as a (Run-time) Service



Coordination as a Service: An Example

- Workflow Management in Virtual Enterprises
- Issues
 - technology / infrastructure heterogeneity
 - knowledge source heterogeneity
 - business process heterogeneity
 - new specific VE processes
- You need
 - infrastructure
 - mediation
 - dynamic workflow management
 - workflow as a service
 - workflow rules as coordination rules
 - coordination media as workflow engines
 - encapsulating workflows into run-time services



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Engineering the (Agent) Interaction Space

- Need for specific high-level abstractions and powerful mechanisms
 - to support the analysis, design and development of multiagent systems as far as *interaction* is concerned
 - Suggesting/supporting methodologies for the construction of open, distributed, heterogeneous, and mobile systems
 - Intrinsically providing systems with features of flexibility, security, support for heterogeneity, intelligence, ...



Roles vs. Organizations

- In a multiagent system, agents must be enabled to inter-operate to fulfil their role in the system
- Globally, the interactions between the different roles have to follow specific rules for the overall organization to work correctly and efficiently



Individual vs. Social Tasks

- agents, as individuals, must be enabled to sense and affect their environment and the other agents living in that environment to survive and reach their own goals (*individual task*)
- the whole society, can't be left in anarchy, as it serves a more general – *supra-agent* – goals (*social task*).



Task-driven MAS Design

- Individual & Social Tasks
 - driving the design
- *Delegation of Responsibility*
 - agents (and societies) encapsulate control
- Impact on the Design
 - individual tasks $\Rightarrow$ design of single agents
 - social tasks $\Rightarrow$ design of
 - agent interaction protocols
 - agent interaction rules



Modelling Agent Societies

- Society = individuals + social rules
- Social laws rule behaviours and interactions
- Social law as coordination laws
- Agent society =
agents + coordination abstractions



Designing Agent Societies

- Defining social task(s)
- Designing
 - social / individual roles
 - interaction protocols
 - social laws
- Choosing the suitable coordination
 - mechanism
 - model
 - pattern
- Designing society upon/around coordination
 - laws
 - invariant
 - media



Developing Agent Societies

- Coordination technology
 - infrastructures, run-times
 - coordination as a service
- Coordination-specific IDE
 - monitoring / inspecting the interaction space
 - need for tools mapping abstractions into manageable metaphors




Society Design & Development: An Example

- Designing WF Participants as Agents
- Designing WFs as Agent Societies
- Designing WF Engines as Coordination Media
 - embodying WF rules as coordination rules
- Example: Using Tuple Centres as WF Engines
 - prescriptive / objective coordination approach
 - generative communication
 - inspectability of interactions
 - “generative coordination”
 - explicit representation of WF rules
 - inspectability of laws
 - incremental / dynamic modification
 - subjective issues
 - coordination technology / IDE



Subjective/Objective Coordination in Design




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Where do we go?



Bounded Coordination Context

- *control room* metaphor
- “forget about the agent”
- coordination laws: bounded interaction
 - *lights* and *screens* (for bounded inputs)
 - *buttons* and *microphones* (for bounded outputs)
- reversing the OO notion of interface
 - meta-level description of the boundaries
 - protocols for negotiating / paying for boundaries?



Design of social laws

- *Description* of social laws:
 - description language
 - enactment
- Global *effect* of social laws:
 - How to predict the influence of social laws to agent behaviour?
 - if social laws are too restrictive, agents won't choose the corresponding coordination service
 - if they are weak, it is not always clear in which direction they will bias the global system behaviour
 - mechanism design, libraries of social laws, . . .





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